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Abstract
Few modelling studies have been carried out to investigate patients’ involvement in the decision-making process in
a healthcare system. Here we perform theoretical and simulation analysis of a healthcare business model involving
three populations: Public Healthcare Providers, Private Healthcare Providers and Patients. The analysis contributes
to healthcare economic modelling by analyzing the dynamics and emergence of cooperative behavior of agents within
the three populations. Resorting to agent-based simulations, we examine the effect of increasing behavioural mutation
and providers’ capacity on patients’ cooperative behaviour. We show that the former introduces more randomness in
agents’ behaviors enabling cooperation to emerge in more difficult conditions. Moreover, when the providers’ capacity
to meet patients’ demand is limited, patients exhibit low levels of cooperation, implying a more difficult cooperation
dilemma in a healthcare system that needs addressing.
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The healthcare system in the UK is regulated by the
Department of Health where explicit rules, activities and
mechanisms are imposed and enforced by the state to
manage social behavior [21]. From the perspective of UK
health policy, the tendency is to understand an incentive
as an economic inducement or benefit, whether tangible
or intangible, resulting from a behavior that impacts the
performance of the healthcare system, whether positively
or negatively. This narrow definition tends to exclude
non-monetary incentives or benefits [10, 21]. This issue
can be solved pragmatically through the introduction of
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) modelling [23], with
various similar examples such as the Public Goods Game
(PGG) and different forms of incentives (both monetary and
non-monetary such as reputation-based ones) [18, 22, 24].
In this research, we investigate the evolution of
cooperation in a complex system, namely the healthcare
system in England, which is made up of populations
∗Corresponding author. Email: t.han@tees.ac.uk
consisting of different healthcare providers interacting with
patients. Our investigation examines individual agents’
behaviors as viewed by an external policymaker, in
this case, the Health Department. Generally, policies are
initiated and managed by the Health Department, which
allocates a specific budget to interfere.
To this end, our analysis here is carried out based
on a baseline model we developed in [2]. This previous
work focuses on numerical analysis of the proposed
healthcare model, studying evolutionary dynamics of three
well-mixed finite populations. The analytical approach
we adopted therein relied on the assumptions of rare
behavioral mutation by the agents, and that all populations
having an equal size. Our finding shows that agents from
all three populations tend to not cooperate (i.e. defect)
[2]. While these simplified assumptions allowed us, as
a very first step, to provide clear mathematical analysis,
they prevented us from analysing some important factors.
Namely, mutation or behavioral exploration, where agents
can freely experiment with new behaviors, has been shown
to play an important role in enabling cooperation in the
context of social dilemmas [3, 6, 11, 20, 26]. As the world
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is facing a rapid increase in populations, most healthcare
capacity is struggling to cope with attendant mounting
demand and to accommodate growing populations’ needs.
Moreover, some scholars have warned that, in reality,
healthcare providers might not be able to meet the treatment
demand from all patients [8]. It is, therefore, viable to
investigate this intensifying trend and study the ratio
of population to hospital bed availability. Currently in
England, UK, the number stands at 474 patients per hospital
bed 1[19].
Therefore, in this paper, we develop agent-based simu-
lations of this baseline model to investigate how relaxing
the above-mentioned assumptions affects the cooperation
outcomes in providers’ and patients’ populations. Namely,
we seek to develop a more insightful understanding of
the dynamical behavior of agents in each population, the
effects of applying a large mutation/exploration rate on the
abundance of cooperation, and the influence of reduced
sizes of the healthcare providers’ population on the agent’s
behavior within the dynamic system and their population.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Related
Work section reviews the most relevant literature. Model
and Methods section presents our healthcare model and
methods applied. Results section discusses agent-based
simulation results. The conclusion summarises our findings
and explores their implications for future work.
2. Related Work
Researchers eager to understand the behavior of different
agent representations within the healthcare system use
AI [30], game theory [1, 28], multiagents system [5] and
big data [16] which are used to predict and understand
behaviors within systems. However, little effort has been
made to study the dynamics of cooperation and other
decision making in the healthcare domain, which usually
involves different actors in the decision making processes.
Our previous work [2] and this work aim to bridge this
important gap by resorting to population-based methods
from EGT to develop an understanding of the dynamics of
cooperative behaviour in this domain.
The rapid development in research on the learning of
social behavior has significantly increased our understand-
ing of the dynamic interaction among individuals from
different populations [23]. Cooperation is one of the fun-
damental aspects to measure the strength and dynamism
of a population [7, 14, 25]. It can be studied by applying
EGT to different mechanisms, such as reciprocal behaviors,
kin selection and costly incentives [13, 23]. EGT has
1England population number was obtained from Office for National Statis-
tic ONS (correct as of mid-2019), available at:https://bit.ly/2MCb3yc. The
number of hospital beds in England (correct as of 2018/9) was calculated
based on data provided by the King’s fund report “NHS hospital bed
numbers: past, present, future”: https://bit.ly/2UfgeZ0; (accessed 6 June
2020).
Parameters' description Symbol




Cost of investment spent by the Pub-
lic/Private healthcare provider
cI
Cost of treatment acquired by the
healthcare provider
cT
Cost of healthcare management cM




P1 P2 P3 Public Private Patient
C C C bR − cI −
cT
bR − cI −
cM
bP + εbP
C C D −cI −cI 0
C D C bR − cI −
cT
0 bP
C D D −cI 0 0
D C C 0 bR − cI −
cM
bP − cT
D C D 0 −cI 0
D D C 0 0 −cT
D D D 0 0 0
Table 1. The healthcare model (Public: P1, Private:
P2, Patient: P3).
been successfully used across major scientific fields such as
biology, ecology, economics, psychology and mathematical
computation [13, 23].
3. Model and Methods
3.1. Healthcare Model
In this section, we summarise the model presented in
[2], where we consider three populations: Public providers
P1, Private providers P2 and Patients P3. While P1
represents the NHS or the public healthcare providers,
P2 represents independent healthcare providers P2 selling
healthcare services, and P3 represents those who seek
personal treatments. Agents from each population P1, P2
and P3 can choose from two strategies: provide/accept
sustainable treatment identified as cooperating, otherwise
the game will be dominated by alternative treatments from
other providers. On each game encounter or iteration, an
agent's payoff is acquired based on the strategy played by
each agent/individual from the three populations. In this
game, an interaction happens among three agents, one from
each of the three populations, see Table 1.
An agent in each of the three populations has two
strategies, cooperate (C) and defect (D). Here the strategy
coincides with the action of an agent, despite the fact that
there is only one decision to make, which can be interpreted
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• C: offers treatment paid for from taxpayers' money,
which consists of paying a cost cI , and in return gets
a reputation benefit.
• D: does not want to pay for the treatment.
Private healthcare providers:
• C: offers treatment either paid by Public (when
Public cooperates) or self-paid by Patient (so
the main cost involved is management cost cM ),
and obtains a reputation benefit bR. In case of
cooperation with the Patient, Private commits to
investing cI from its revenue.
• D: does not want to offer the treatment.
Patient:
• C: accepts being treated and pays for the treat-
ment cT when treated by the Private; Patient obtains
health benefit bP if at least one provider cooperates
and extra health benefit when both providers cooper-
ate ε.
• D: rejects the treatment and looks for alternative
treatment mostly overseas, where above conditions
are correct, and: bP > 0, ε > 0 and cT > 0.
Thus, given the strategies of players in each population,
there are 8 possible strategic combinations or scenarios,
represented by XYZ where X, Y, Z can be either C or D. We
summarize a few of them below (full details can be found
in [2])
• CCC: individuals from all three populations choose
to cooperate. The Public pays for the treatment
provided by a Private healthcare provider and the
Patient accepts the provided treatment in pursuit
of her/his own benefit or well-being. The Public,
which bears the costs of investment and pays for
the Patient's treatment (cI + cT ), covered from its
allocated budget, gains a reputation benefit bR.
Reputation benefits are derived from the Patient's
satisfaction with the provided service. On the other
hand, the Private healthcare provider will provide
the required treatment to the Patient and receive the
payment covering the costs from the Public. The cost
of investment cI of the Private healthcare provider is
to invest in staffing and healthcare facilities, while cM
refers to administrative and operational costs. Also,
the Private provider will obtain a reputation benefit
with the Public bR. Patient gets extra health benefit
εbP as both healthcare providers are cooperating (ε
represents a synergistic factor).
Figure 1. The cooperation level in each of the three
populations as a function of the sectors’ benefit bR and
patient’s benefit bP . Other parameters: cI , cT , cM =
1;N1, N2, N3 = 100; ε = 0.2;µ = 10−4; β = 0.1.
• DDD: this scenario consists of all three agents
choosing not to interact with one another, thus all the
agents get a zero payoff.
3.2. Method: Evolutionary Dynamics for
Three Populations
EGT method is adopted to study the evolutionary dynamics
and interactions among individuals from three distinct finite
populations: P1, P2 and P3. The populations are of fixed
sizes N1, N2 and N3, respectively. In each time step,
from a randomly selected population, a randomly selected
individual A with fitness fA imitates another randomly
selected individual B with fB fitness using the pairwise
comparison rule, a popular and standard approach to
implementing social learning in EGT [23, 27]. Namely, the
probability ρ that A adopts B's strategy is given by the
Fermi's function
ρ = [1 + e−β[fB−fA]]−1, (1)
where β > 0 represents the ‘intensity of selection’ or
‘imitation strength’; β = 0 represents neutral drift where
imitation decision is random, while for β →∞ the
imitation decision is increasingly deterministic. In our
results, we set β = 0.1, which is in accordance with
previous theoretical and experimental works [20, 29].
When mutation or behavioral exploration [6, 9, 20] is not
rare, we consider that, before A considers to imitate B, with
a probability µ, it changes to a randomly selected strategy
from its behavioural space (in this case, C or D). That is,
with probability (1 − µ) A considers to imitate B as above.
Individuals in each population have the choice to play C
or D. As described above, there are eight possible scenarios
corresponding to the the eight possible combinations of the
strategies within the three populations: CCC, CCD, CDC,
CDD, DCC, DCD, DDC, DDD. Denoting the numbers of
cooperators in P1, P2 and P3 by x, y, and z, respectively,
the payoff of each strategy can be written as follows:
P P ublics (x, y, z) = Psyz
P P rivates (x, y, z) = Pxsz
P P atients (x, y, z) = Pxys
 Pairwise comparison (2)
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Figure 2. Typical simulation runs showing the cooperation levels over time in the three populations (red for
Public, blue for Private and green for Patient). The plots represent the frequency of cooperation adopted by the
populations for different values of bR and bP . Other parameters as in Figure 1.
where Pxyz is the payoff for the strategy selected by
individuals from one of the stated populations, and (x,y,z)
represents the selected strategies C or D. For instance,
individuals from P1 have the options to play C or D. The
selected strategy will replace the s at x vertex, while y and
z vertices remain unchanged for selected strategies for the
Public population in this instance.
P ublic→ f (Cyz) > PDyz
P rivate→ f (xCz) > PxDz
P atient → f (xyC) > PxyD
(3)
3.3. Agent-based Simulations
As mutation is not rare, we perform agent-based
simulations to study the evolutionary dynamics. Initially,
agents in the three populations are given a random strategy
(C or D). In each generation or time step, agents’ fitness
is calculated as in Table. 1. Namely, the fitness of an
individual adopting a strategy s within a population is
derived from the average obtained from the tripartite one-
shot game described in Table 1. A randomly selected
individual in each game obtains an average payoff given by
[7, 22]:
f P ublicS (x, y, z) = yzP
P ublic
SCC + (1 − y)zP P ublicSDC + y(1 −
z)P P ublicSCD + (1 − y)(1 − z)P P ublicSDD ,
f P rivateS (x, y, z) = xzPCSCP rivate + (1 − x)zP P rivateDSC +
x(1 − z)P P rivateCSD + (1 − s)(1 − z)P P rivateDSD ,
f P atientS (x, y, z) = xyP
P atient
CCS + (1 − x)yP P atientDCS + x(1 −
y)P P atientsCDS + (1 − x)(1 − y)P P atientDDS ,
where f PS (x, y, z) represents agents’ average payoff in a
population P while adopting strategy s, assuming that the
population is present in the vertices (x,y,z). P SABC denotes
the payoff that an individual playing in a group with a
strategy profile derives from state S where public plays A,
private plays B and patient plays C . These payoffs are
shown in Table 1.
Each simulation of the stochastic modelling runs for a
number of generations (at least 40,000), where a stable
state is reached in general (see examples in Fig. 2). To
ensure accuracy, the accumulated results are then averaged
over the last 100 time steps, and furthermore, for each
parameter configuration, the results were averaged over
50 independent realisations. As mutation is adopted in the
simulations, no absorbed monomorphic state is reached .
4. Results
In this study we conduct agent-based simulations (see
Methods), where agents from the three populations P1, P2
and P3 interact in a one-shot game and learn how they
influence the level of cooperation to sustain cost-effective
services and better patient satisfaction.
Figure 1 shows the cooperation levels adopted in the
populations for varying the sectors’ benefit bR and patient’s
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benefit bP . In general, cooperation in all populations is most
abundant when both benefits are sufficiently large. The two
sectors have similar cooperation for the whole parameter
space, except when both benefits are small, where the
private sector has a slightly higher level of cooperation.
To better understand the detailed dynamics, in Figure
2 we show the evolution of cooperation over time in
each population for different combinations of the benefits.
Indeed, we can see that when bR is large (see bR = 6,
bottom row), all the three populations quickly converge to
full cooperation even for small bP . For intermediate bR (see
bR = 1, middle row), P1 converges to defection, while P2
still maintains some level of cooperation and P3 have high
levels of cooperation when bP is large (i.e. equals 3). When
bR is small, all populations converge to defection. That is,
P2 population is more willing to cooperate with P3 for quite
low bP (where bP ≤ 1 and bR ≤ 1). On the other hand, P3
requires better reputation benefit bR to cooperate with P3
and provides the desired services. As a consequence, P3 has
to pay extra cost equivalent to cT as represented in Table 1,
i.e: DCC for the Patient’s payoff (bP − cT ) compared to the
other scenarios, CCC or CDC, where the cost equals zero.
4.1. The effect of mutation
We now study how increasing the mutation rate µ affects
the cooperation outcome in each population. Note that so
far we consider rare mutation or low mutation rate µ =
10−4, recovering results from our previous work using
small mutation dynamics [2]. Fig. 4 shows results for
higher mutation rates, namely, µ = 10−k , with k = 1.5, 1
and 0.5. As expected, as larger mutation leads to greater
levels of randomness in agents’ behaviors, we observe
more defection in scenarios where cooperation is abundant
(high benefits), and vice versa, i.e. more cooperation in
Figure 3. Frequencies of CCC for increasing muta-
tion rate, µ. It represents the trends of different bR
values for the stated value of bP on each plot. Other
parameters as in Figure 1.
Figure 4. Cooperation levels in three populations for
different values of µ. First column for P1, second
column for P2, and third column for P3. µ values are
as specified on the right side. Other parameters as in
Figure 1.
previous scenarios with abundant defections. Interestingly,
for intermediate µ (µ = 10−1), P1’s cooperation mostly
depends on P3’s benefit, while P2 is more dependent on
the reputation benefit. This observation can also be seen in
Fig. 3, where we plot the frequency of CCC. For sufficiently
large µ, the frequency of CCC always converges to 1/8
regardless of the values of the benefits, which is when all
populations converge to 50% cooperation.
4.2. The effect of unequal population sizes
In reality, the availability of hospital beds is very limited
for the increasing number of patients; i.e: winter long
waiting time in A&E or in a pandemic (e.g. as is the case
with the COVID-19). We study the effect of this factor
by looking at different providers’ population size ratios to
that of the Patient’s population. Fig. 5 shows simulation
results for two different providers’ sizes, 10 & 5. The results
reveal that P2 cooperates more with lower providers’ and
patients’ benefits. Whereas the P1 population still prefers
to cooperate with higher reputation benefit bR. Conversely,
P3 shows a significantly different behavior in the decision
making process by defecting upon low health benefit 0.1 <
bP < 1 and willing to cooperate when bP < 0.1 and bP ≥ 1
for larger providers’ population sizes.
These observations show that, in a more realistic setting
where both P1 and P2 usually have a lower capacity than
what is required by P3, it is more difficult to ensure
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Figure 5. Cooperation levels in each population
based on the ratio of hospital bed availability provided
by healthcare providers compared to the size of the P3
population(N3=100). Where the size of the P1,P2 is:
first row N1 = N2 = 10 and second row N1 = N2 = 5.
Other parameters as in Figure 1.
cooperation from the patients. That is, the cooperation
issue is more severe, which therefore requires additional
supporting mechanisms such as incentives to maintain
cooperation. We are currently studying this important
setting.
5. Conclusions
We have studied cooperation outcomes and evolutionary
dynamics of a three-population healthcare model using
extensive agent-based simulations. We analyze cooperation
outcomes for incremental rate of mutation, and compare
them with those when it is rare, as reported in our previous
work. This result can represent realistic scenarios derived
from some elective treatments such as hip replacements
[15]. To link our model to realistic scenarios it will make
use of data published by the NHS and complemented
with figures obtained from the Patient Reports Outcome
Measures [17] and the Care Quality Commission [4].
We found abundance of cooperation closely linked with
high benefits. Interestingly, for sufficiently high mutation
rates, more cooperation also emerged in scenarios that are
previously dominated by defection in all populations.
We explored the effect of reducing the size of the
healthcare provider population on cooperation between
the three populations. We found that the Patient is less
likely to cooperate (small abundance) when the Providers’
populations are small, which means that providers have
a limited capacity to accommodate the patients’ needs.
This finding reveals a critical cooperation problem that
needs to be resolved. This is an important issue since in
reality providers might not always be able to meet patients’
demand, especially when health crises occur such as in
the time of a pandemic (such as COVID-19). Again, our
findings reiterate the important role of patients in healthcare
decision making processes, which has been pointed out
in previous reports [17] but usually omitted in modelling
works.
As future work, we plan to explore new mechanisms
to improve cooperation in this important and realistic
setting, such as via positive or negative incentives in the
form of peer and institutional rewards and punishments
[2, 12, 24]. Moreover, in this paper, as a first step, we
assumed that providers have the same capacity. However,
in reality, the public and private sectors may have very
different capacities, which might depend on different
regions and their local demands. We plan to provide a more
comprehensive analysis of how difference in providers’
capacities, in relation to the patients’ demand [19].
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